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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State appeals from District Judge John R. Stegner's Judgment vacating 
Respondent John Marr's conviction for felony domestic battery. This is Mr. Marr's 
Supplemental Brief addressing the issue raised in the Supplemental Brief of Appellant. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The facts and course of proceedings are set out in previous briefing. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUE AND ARGUMENT 
The District Court did not err in concluding that Mr. Marr's trial counsel was also 
ineffective in failing to cross-examine Ms. Jones when she appeared to be under the 
influence while testifying at trial. 
1. Introduction 
Marci Jones' s excessive alcohol use and temperament weaves its way throughout 
this case. Despite that, it was addressed only obliquely at Mr. Marr's criminal trial 
because of trial counsel's unreasonable errors. Most notably, trial counsel missed the 
connection between Ms. Jones's character while drinking and self-defense. But she also 
ignored Mr. Marr's warning to her that Jones had been drinking before she took the 
stand. The district court was correct to recognize the importance of this issue, its strong 
tie to the themes in this case, and trial counsel's unreasonable failure to follow-up in 
anyway. 
2. Standard of Review 
The standard is set out in the parties' earlier briefing: in a post-conviction matter, 
this Court defers to the District Court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 495-96, 975 P.3d 782, 783-84 (1999). This Court 
then exercises free review over the District Court's application of law to those facts. (Id.) 
3. Legal Standards Governing Claims of Ineffective Assistance 
A defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel when (1) his counsel committed errors fell below an objective 
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standard of reasonableness and (2) he suffered actual prejudice as a result. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984); accord Johnson v. State, 156 Idaho 7, 10-11, 319 
P.3d 491, 494-95 (2014). Prejudice means that there is a reasonable probability that the 
outcome would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S at 694. A reasonable probability 
is one that is "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. 
4. The District Court's Finding of Ineffective Assistance is Supported by the 
Record 
John Marr told his trial counsel that Marci Jones had a problem with alcohol 
"every single time [they] talked." (EH Tr., p. 15: 23-34.) He told her that when Ms. Jones 
was drinking she became "belligerent and aggressive." (EH Tr., p. 15: 25, p. 16: 1-2.) 
Trial counsel knew that Ms. Jones had a record of "misdemeanors related to drinking." 
(EH Tr., p. 20: 19-20.) She testified that it was "pretty obvious" that Ms. Jones had a 
reputation for drinking to excess and becoming belligerent or aggressive. 
Against that backdrop, Ms. Jones appeared in a "shaky" condition at the criminal 
trial and was mumbling her words during her testimony. (EH Tr., p. 24: 19-25.) When 
trial counsel asked Mr. Marr whether he thought Ms. Jones had been drinking that day, 
Mr. Marr told counsel that it appeared that she had, but counsel was dismissive because 
he "always said yes." (EH Tr., p. 25: 8.) She asked one question-when the last time Ms. 
Jones had a drink- but did not follow-up when the court overruled an objection. (JT Tr., 
p. 118: 9-22.) She agreed at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that cross-examining 
Ms. Jones's about her condition while testifying would be fair impeachment. (EH Tr., p. 
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25: 15-18.) She gave no tactical reason for asking a single question before dropping the 
matter altogether. 
There is enough in this record to find that Marci Jones appeared to be under the 
influence at the criminal trial. John Marr had personal experience with Ms. Jones' s 
behavior and he notified his counsel of Jones' s condition. Trial counsel admitted that 
she appeared "shaky" and "mumbly," and that her condition "was on [her] radar." 
Regardless whether Ms. Jones would have admitted that she was drunk, Mr. 
Marr contends that it was ineffective assistance not to question her. It would have been 
fertile ground for cross-examination in any event. Counsel could have again asked Ms. 
Jones if she had anything to drink that day. If she said yes, then counsel could explore 
her ability to recall and remember the events accurately. If she said no, then counsel 
could follow up with questions about whether it was normal for her to mumble her 
words or to appear shaky when speaking. The jury could draw the obvious conclusions, 
undermining Ms. Jones's credibility further. It is apparent that the jury did not believe 
her entirely, as it acquitted Mr. Marr of attempted strangulation. This type of 
questioning would have implicitly looped back and reminded the jury of Ms. Jones' s 
character trait for hostility and belligerence while drunk, had counsel investigated and 
developed that theme. 
For these reasons, Mr. Marr asks the Court to uphold the district court on both 
grounds. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Marr respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court. 
Respectfully submitted on this 8th day of February, 2017. 
Craig Durham 
Attorney for Respondent 
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